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STATUTES DETERMINATIVE OF ISSUES 
Utah Code Ann., § 78-27-56 (1988) 
Attorney's fees - Award where action or defense in bad faith -
Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that 
the action or defense to the action was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or 
limited fees against a party under Subsection (1), but only if the 
court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of 
impecuniosity in the action before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection (1). 
iii 
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CROSS-APP*:TJ.ANT.q' REPLY ARGUMENT 
POINT VI 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE ATTORNEYS FEE CLAIM OF 
CONDER & WANGSGARD SHOULD BE DISCOUNTED BY 10%. 
1. Cross Appellants are not required to marshal1 evidence 
when challenging conclusions of law. 
Cross Appellee Dylon has asserted that the Co-personal 
Representatives have failed to marshall the facts, as required, 
when challenging a trial court's findings of fact. Dylon fails to 
understand that the Co-personal Representatives are not challenging 
the trial court's findings of fact on the 10% discount issue. The 
Co-personal Representatives are challenging the trial court's 
conclusion that Conder & Wangsgard's fee claim should be reduced by 
the amount of profit decedent could have made on his remodel job. 
On page 46 of their brief, the Co-personal Representatives state 
that "the subsiding facts found by the court are correct, however, 
this ruling wrongly equates the value of Conder & Wangsgard's 
services with profits which may have been obtained with the remodel 
job." The court received affidavits from both sides regarding the 
profit margins in the construction industry. (R. 396-399, 401-
408). Nowhere in their brief do the Co-personal Representatives 
allege that the trial court's findings of a 10% profit were 
unsupported by evidence in the record. 
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In Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P. 2d 487 (Utah App. 1993), 
the court explained when marshalling would be required by an 
appellant. The court stated that "a prerequisite to an appellant's 
attack on findings of fact is the requirement that appellant 
marshall all the evidence in support of the findings in order to 
demonstrate 'that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings.'" Id., 
quoting, Grayson Roper Ltd. v Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 
1989). The court then went on, in quoting Bountiful v. Rileyr 784 
P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989), to say that "an appellant's challenges 
to the trial court's legal conclusions, 'on the other hand, are 
reviewed for correctness and are not given special deference.'" 
Reinbold/ 850 p.2d at 489. 
The appellate court merely needs to review the trial court's 
legal conclusion that Conder & Wangsgard's services should be 
reduced 10% to account for profits decedent could have made on the 
remodel for correctness. 
2. The reasonableness of Conder & Wangsgard's claim was not 
an issue raised by Dylon. 
In his response, Cross-Appellee Dylon rises the reasonableness 
of Conder & Wangsgard's attorney fees claim. This issue was not 
disputed by Dylon at the trial court, Dylon did not ask for the 
2 
claim to be discounted for any reason. In fact, Dylon's attorney 
stated regarding Conder & Wangsgard's fees: 
Mr. Abies: Well, he may have done the work. He may have done 
the work. That's right. And I don't think that was disputed, 
nor did we even go into the question of the - - reasonableness 
of the thing. I won't - - I didn't challenge that. It's a 
question of whether or not the claim was legally sufficient . 
. . (R. 1243). 
Dylon's attorney challenged the attorney fee claim only as a 
creditor's claim and not with regard to the reasonableness of the 
fees. In spite of this fact, Dylon argues on appeal that Conder & 
Wangsgard's claim should not be viewed as a creditor's claim and 
challenges the reasonableness of the fees. Dylon waived this 
argument long ago and cannot now assert such a position. 
The court, on its own initiative, reviewed the reasonableness 
of Conder & Wangsgard's fees using Dixie State Bank v. Brackenr 764 
P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), even though Dylon did not raise the issue of 
reasonableness at the trial court level. Had Conder & Wangsgard 
been requesting an award of attorney fees rather than being in the 
position of creditor, a court would have been correct to review the 
reasonableness of an attorney fee award on its own initiative using 
the criteria set forth in Dixie. However, in this case, the Co-
personal Representatives were merely petitioning the court to 
approve a creditor's claim. Dylon was only concerned with whether 
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the claim was timely presented and not with the amount of the claim 
itself. The application of Dixie to this claim is not appropriate 
under the circumstances. But even if Dixie were applicable, the 
trial court should not have reduced Conder & Wangsgard's claim. 
Ultimately, the 10% reduction ordered by the trial court had no 
bearing on whether Conder & Wangsgard's fees were reasonable. The 
court discounted the claim based on the profit margin in the 
construction industry. The court7s conclusion in equating profit 
margin with Conder & Wangsgard's legal services and order a 10% 
reduction of said fees is flawed. Conder's testimony shows that 
the construction services would be a credit against the attorney7s 
fee bill. (R. 382-386). The court itself found that the 
remodeling was to be a credit against legal services provided by 
Conder & Wangsgard. (R. 432). It additionally found that Decedent 
would have "earned a profit of 10% on the $37,820.81 claim by 
Conder & Wangsgard and is entitled to a credit therefor." (R. 
435). The profit margin enjoyed by the construction industry, was 
the sole measure of the fee reduction. Even the most strained 
reading of Dixie does not include construction industry economics 
in attorney's fees determinations. 
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POINT VII 
DYLON'S ATTORNEY WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR HIS SERVICES TO THE ESTATE. 
1. Cross-Appellee has improperly inferred a $10,504.79 
benefit to the Estate. 
Dylon attempts to justify the Court's award of $1,000 by 
arguing that his attorney performed work that benefited the Estate 
by $10,504.79. Dylon asserts that his attorney benefited the 
Estate, not only by causing the 10% reduction in Conder & 
Wangsgard's claim, but by challenging the wake expenses and causing 
a reduction of $5,000 in the Estate's attorney fees. 
Dylon's argument goes beyond the trial court's findings to 
infer benefits to the Estate that the trial court itself did not 
recognize in awarding the $1,000 attorney fees. In its Finding of 
Fact No. 14, the trial court was very clear as to why it was 
awarding $1,000 attorney fees. "Dylon Husband is therefore 
entitled to an award of attorney's fees in the sum of $1,000 for 
pursuing the objection to payment of fees to Conder & Wangsgard 
plus $213.40 as costs." (R. 677). This finding pertains only to 
the preceding paragraph, Finding No. 13, which reads "In 
conjunction with the objection to payment of attorney's fees 
incurred by decedent during his life, the efforts of counsel 
Wendell Abies caused the estate to benefit in the sum of 
5 
$3,782.08." (R. 677). 
Dylon also points to a minute entry of September 24, 1992 (R. 
664) and the trial court's comments at a June 23, 1992 hearing 
where the court stated, "the estate did benefit [by] the difference 
between the claim and the amount of the discount, so it was some 
benefit to the estate." (R. 767). In addition, at the August 20, 
1992 hearing, the court said "I awarded them fees, less the 
percentage. That's just — that was this case, pure and simple. 
The remainder of the issues you have brought up in this case really 
had no bearing that would justify awarding fees." (R. 1563). 
$1,000 in attorney fees were awarded for the 10% (3,782.08) 
reduction. 
The benefit to the Estate did not come from the efforts of 
Dylon's attorney but from the trial court's own actions. 
Appellant's attorney should not be rewarded because the trial 
court, on its own initiative, caused the 10% reduction. Even more 
importantly, there was no statute or contract on which to base the 
fee award and the $1,000 amount should not be paid from the Estate. 
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2. There was no basis for the trial court to award 
Pylon's attorney any fees. 
In their brief, Co-personal Representatives applied the 
guidelines set forth in Dixie State Bank v Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 
(Utah 1985) even though there was no statute or contract which 
authorized an award of attorney's fees. Aside from the three one 
page affidavits mentioned on page 50 of the Co-personal 
Representatives' brief, Appellant's attorney did nothing for his 
award. He made no motion or argument to the court to cause a 
benefit to the Estate to justify an award of fees. The court went 
so far as to tell Dylon's counsel to present testimony regarding 
the reduction issue. (R. 1329-1330). However, he failed to follow 
the trial court's instructions. Additionally, the trial court said 
"If I went by what you did, I shouldn't have even discounted it at 
all." (R. 1329-1330). Even the trial court recognized that 
Dylon's attorney did nothing to cause the Estate of benefit by 
$3,782.08 (the 10% discount). 
Under Utah law, attorney fees are awardable "only if 
authorized by statute or by contract." Id. at 988. The court, out 
of kindness, awarded Appellant's attorney $1,000. The $1,000 award 
simply was not justified. 
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POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY CHARGED THE COST OF A WAKE TO 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE CONDER AND LINDSAY HUSBAND'S SHARE OF 
THE ESTATE. 
1. Co-personal Representatives need not marshall the 
evidence where they are challenging the court's legal 
conclusions, 
A conclusion of law is accorded no particular deference and it 
is reviewed for correctness. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 
P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). The issue of whether a wake can be a 
funeral expense is a legal issue and the conclusion is a conclusion 
of law. Hence, the Co-personal Representatives are not required to 
marshall the evidence in support of the trial court's conclusions. 
2. Reasonable funeral expenses may include customary 
functions such as wakes which are associated with the 
death of an individual. 
Dylon, in his response, attempts to characterize the 
decedent's wake as an unorthodox and inappropriate function to hold 
upon the death of a loved one. However, wakes have significant 
historical value and, in some cultures, are as important as the 
burial itself.1 In this case, the decedent Mr. Husband would have 
1
 Wake 3. The watching (esp. by night) of relatives and 
friends beside the body of a dead person from death to burial, or 
during a part of that time; the drinking, feasting, and other 
observances incidental to this. Now chiefly Anglo-Irish or with 
reference to Irish custom. Also applied to similar funeral customs 
in other times or among pagan peoples. Oxford English Dictionary 
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wanted a wake to be held at his death. (R. 855-857). Dylon 
himself agreed that the wake was an appropriate function in 
remembrance of his father. (R. 840, 845). It would have been 
remiss for a wake not to be held in remembrance of the decedent. 
Courts have defined what constitutes funeral expenses. In In 
re Estate of Scherpich, 210 N.Y.S.2d 655 (Kings Co.Surr.Ct.1961), 
(citation omitted), the court held that funeral expenses "include 
accustomed forms and ceremonies attending the disposition of 
remains including reimbursement for expenditures for music, food 
and flowers." See, Estate of Kircher. 473 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sur. 1984) 
(expenses for luncheon on date of burial was reasonable); see also, 
In Re DiNezzo/s Estate, 267 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Eric Co.Surr.Ct. 1966) 
(reception at restaurant was not unusual nor excessive and 
objection to cost was overruled). 
Dylon cites to an 1890 Pennsylvania case as the authority on 
how courts should consider a wake. The case stands for the 
proposition that the expenses of a wake, if not unreasonable, will 
be allowed as an item of funeral charge. "If the evidence had 
shown that the wake, which preceded the burial of the decedent, was 
made an occasion of feasting or intemperance, its expenses as an 
Vol. II, pg. 31 (1971). 
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item of funeral charges, should have been disallowed." In Re 
Johnson's Estate, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 1, 3 (1890). In In Re Johnson's 
Estate, the court found the wake was a proper funeral expense. The 
wake held at decedent's club was not an occasion of feasting or 
intemperance but was an opportunity for decedent's friends and 
family to fondly remember him. 
The wake is a reasonable funeral expense. Since the personal 
representative, by statute, has the responsibility to pay all 
reasonable funeral expenses, the heir Lindsay Husband and Conder 
should not have to pay for the wake. 
POINT IX 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT CHARGING PART OF THE CO-PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE'S ATTORNEY FEE BILL TO DYLON HUSBAND. 
1. The Co-personal Representatives are not challenging 
the trial court's Findings of Fact and are not required 
to marshall the evidence. 
The trial court found that six of Dylon's seven causes of 
action in his petition to surcharge Conder were without merit. 
Finding No. 25 and 26 state: 
25. Dylon Husband's petition to surcharge personal 
representative Jerrald D. Conder for rental on the 1988 Camero 
IROC Z and the unauthorized distribution of decedents personal 
property to Diane Mills and Ron Husband is without merit. 
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26. The Court finds that the personal representatives have 
properly gathered and accounted for all of the assets of the 
estate and that all claims, except as set forth herein, of 
Dylon Husband are without merit. (R. 679). 
The cost for the wake was the only claim the court deemed 
meritorious. 
The court made no finding regarding whether Dylon7s claims 
were brought in good faith. Therefore the findings themselves are 
legally inadequate for the court to conclude that Dylon should not 
have to pay the personal representative7s attorney fees. Under 
Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993) (citation 
omitted^, the court explained that where "the findings are legally 
inadequate the exercise of marshalling the evidence in support of 
the findings becomes futile and the appellant is under no 
obligation to marshal." Here, the findings are legally inadequate 
and Co-personal Representatives are under no duty to marshal. 
2. Dylon has failed to show the claims brought by him 
had merit or were brought in good faith. 
Cross-Appellee states that "the claims had evidence to support 
them, were debatable legally and they were brought in good faith." 
Cross-Appellee's Brief at pg. 30. Cady v. Johnson, 671 P. 2d 149 
(Utah 1983) requires more than a conclusory statement that the 
claims were brought in good faith and were legally debatable. 
Dylon offers no argument to rebut the lack of good faith asserted 
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by the Co-personal Representatives in their brief. Dylon took 
advantage of the other heir by the meritless allegations in his 
Petition to Surcharge the Personal Representative. The other heir 
had no desire to take part in Dylon7s challenges. Dylon7s self 
interest at the expense of the other heir is prima facie bad faith. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 states that "the court may award 
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines the action or defense to the action was without merit 
and not brought or asserted in good faith." Cady defines without 
merit as "bordering on frivolity" and "of little weight or 
importance having no basis in law or fact." Id. at 151. 
Regardless of Dylon's opinion regarding his seven claims in his 
Petition to Surcharge Conder, six of Dylon#s seven claims were held 
to be meritless by the trial court. (R. 679). Co-personal 
Representatives have shown that those claims were also brought in 
bad faith. Because the requirements of §78-27-56 have been met, 
Dylon should be ordered to pay the personal representative's 
attorney fees on the claims made in his Petition to Surcharge 
Personal Representative. 
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3. Co-personal Representative Snow reported his findings 
on the Conder & Wangsgard claim to the trial court at the 
June 14, 1991 hearing. 
Co-personal Representative Snow testified extensively at the 
June 14, 1991 hearing about his investigation into the Conder & 
Wangsgard claim. (R. 1010-1020). Snow testified that, after his 
investigation, he concluded that the work was actually performed 
and that the fees were reasonable. (R. 1015-1016). Dylon's 
attorney cross-examined Snow on his testimony. (R. 1018-1020). 
Cross-Appellee is simply wrong to state that Mr. Snow "did not 
report at any time to the court with reference to the Conder & 
Wangsgard claim." Cross-Appellee's Brief at pg. 31. The trial 
court heard the details of Mr. Snow's investigation and conclusions 
on June 14, 1991 and Dylon's attorney cross-examined Mr. Snow. In 
fact, specific findings were made regarding Mr. Snow's report. (R. 
434, Finding #11). 
Cross-Appellee fails to address the real issue that Dylon 
reneged on the stipulation prepared by his counsel. After Mr. Snow 
concluded his investigation with a result contrary to Dylon's 
desired outcome, Dylon proceeded to continue pursuing the very 
issue covered under paragraph number 2 of the January 28, 1991 
stipulation. 
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This continued assault on an issue which was dealt with by 
stipulation occurred at the expense of the other heir and was not 
made in good faith. The other heir should not have to pay for the 
attorney fees incurred as a result of Dylon7s failure to abide by 
the stipulation. 
4. Dylon's arguments exemplify the meritless claims the 
Co-personal Representatives have had to confront in 
probating the Estate. 
In his response, Dylon argues that the only reason Karen 
Husband gave her support to personal representative Conder was 
because of a payoff to Karen and her attorney for their testimony 
and support of Conder. Dylon cites to no evidence which would 
support his distorted argument. Claims for alimony and support by 
an ex-wife which are paid by the personal representative of 
decedent's estate are not "payoffs" for giving support to the 
personal representative. The Cross-Appellee then goes on to accuse 
Conder of lying under oath and of repeatedly misstating the facts 
with no evidence to support his attacks. 
Dylon's arguments demonstrate the type of meritless claims 
brought without good faith that the Co-personal Representatives 
have continually had to confront in probating the Estate. 
The other heir should not have to pay for the meritless claims 
and challenges Dylon pursued at her expense where she actively 
14 
declined to participate in the litigation. Dylon alone should be 
charged for all of his meritless claims and challenges. 
CONCLUSION 
Dylon's attorney did not benefit the Estate by causing the 10% 
discount in the Conder & Wangsgard claim and should not be 
compensated. Additionally, there was no statutory or contract 
basis under which the court was permitted to award fees. Dylon's 
attorney is not entitled to any fee award whatsoever. 
Conder & Wangsgard's attorney fees which made up its claim to 
the Estate were never challenged by Dylon as unreasonable. The 
court utilized inappropriate standards in reducing the claim. 
Conder & Wangsgard's claim should not have been discounted by the 
trial court. 
The wake was a reasonable funeral expense where the personal 
representative authorized and the heirs, including Dylon, ratified 
the propriety of the event. The cost of the wake should be charged 
to the Estate and not to the personal representative and the other 
heir. 
The Co-personal Representatives actively worked toward 
wrapping the Estate up in an expeditious manner. However, Dylon 
continually bombarded the Estate with meritless challenges at every 
turn and caused the delay in winding up of the Estate. Dylon 
15 
should have to bear the costs of litigation. Co-personal 
representatives, Conder and Snow, respectfully submit that this 
matter should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to 
modify its order and enter judgment in accordance with the 
foregoing. \ 
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